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Appetites and Actions in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology
Tom Olshewsky, University o f Kentucky and Drexel University
The recognition in recent decades of Aristotle’s phenomenological modes of 
inquiry has challenged long-standing interpretations of “Aristotelian doctrine”. One such 
case is the so-called practical syllogism1 2, for which the conclusion is not a proposition, 
but an action. This has been a stumbling block to our treatment of the reason/appetite 
paradigm as the apparent source of human movement. What I hope to show here is that 
the paradigm is a false start for attempts to understand the psychology of animate motion 
in On the Soul III 9-11, at least as this has usually been understood. There, it serves 
Aristotle only as an appearance for the beginning of an inquiry into the origins of animate 
movement. Once properly understood, this account will lead us in turn to new 
understandings of the practical syllogism.
The beginning for our current inquiry must lie not in explorations about 
inferences from propositions, but rather in distinctions of dispositionalities. This is well 
articulated in Aristotle’s own discriminations of rational from non-rational potentialities 
in Metaphysics IX-5 :
Regarding potentialities o f the latter [non-rational potentialities], when the agent and 
the patient meet in the way appropriate to the potentiality in question, the one must act 
and the other be acted upon, but with the former [animate and rational], this is not 
necessary. For the latter are productive o f one effect each, but the former are productive 
o f opposing ones, so that they would produce contraiy effects at the same time; but this 
is impossible. It is necessary, therefore, that the determination for this must be 
something else; I call this appetite (όρεξ i v) or choice (προαίρεσ iv). Which of the 
two [effects] it yearns for (όρέγηθαι ) decisively, that it will do, whenever it is 
capable [of doing it] under the circumstances and it comes near to that which is capable 
of undergoing it. (1048a6-12)
Two striking features of this account of rational action are that the determinate authority 
for the action lies with όρεξ ι ς rather than νους, and that όρεξ ι g is here equated with 
π ρ ο α ίρ εσ ις . I take the accounts of motives to action in On the Soul III: 10, 11, to be an 
exposition of the psychological conditions for just such a determination.
A third feature gives a base for my translation of ‘ό ρ ε ξ ις ' as ‘appetite’. As 
Abraham Adel once noted, the etymology of the two terms is the virtually the same. 
From the Latin, ap-petitio is to strive toward. The verb ‘όρέγω ' basically meant to
11 say “so-called” here as a cautionary for our interpretation. Aristotle does not himself so call. But as Stan 
Smith pointed out to me in another discussion, Aristotle uses the term ‘σΟΛογισμός' much more widely 
and variably than, our standard notions of a three-term categorical syllogism, more in its traditional idiom of 
collecting before the mind. It is important that we not begin at the outset with the presumption of an A-I-I 
form into which we attempt to fit what Aristotle has to say about the practical syllogism. This has been a 
flaw, I think, in much of the recent literature. In the time allotted, I cannot here engage critically with other 
worthy efforts to parse the significance by Martha Nussbaum, J.B. Skemp, Henry Richardson, David 
Charles, Steven Hudson, etc., but I remain critically conscious of their efforts.
2 Abraham Edel, Aristotle and His Philosophy, Chapel Hill, 1982, p. 430, n. 14. He argues briefly and 
elegantly against current tendencies to translate ‘ο ρ ε ξ ι ς ’ as ‘desire’ with interesting allusions to 
Eighteenth Century moral psychology.
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stretch out or to stretch toward. It was used already in Aristotle’s time by metaphoric 
extension to mean to yearn for. In Aristotle’s hands, it receives further extension in his 
account of matter as by its very nature yearning for its form {Physics I, 192al8). Thus, 
his choice of 4ο ρ ε ξ ις ’ as his generic term for the appetitive links it to the 
dispositionality of the unfulfilled seeking its fulfillment, of a lack seeking an object. He 
can then in On the Soul III-9 classify βουλησις as a calculative appetite, έπι θυμ ία  as a 
desiderative appetite, and θυμός as a passionate appetite, not according to their place in 
the soul, but according to their function in their stretching out toward fulfillment.
Aristotle lays out this classification as a base for answering his initial question in 
III-9 about what in the soul originates movement: Is it a single part of the soul? To this he 
can answer that he has elaborated faculties that are far more distinct than the traditional 
[platonic] parts, and that, if there were such parts, appetite would be in each, and it would 
be absurd to break this faculty into parts. Having thus dispatched the platonic model, and 
concluded that appetite cannot be analyzed in terms of parts or of other faculties, he 
returns to his original question: What does originate movement in the soul? While noetic 
functions (here including imagination) are inadequate to the role, since knowledge does 
not necessarily produce action, appetite also evidently falls short, since the self-controlled 
{¿γκρατής) follow their νους  (sensibleness, puipose, apprehension) instead of their 
yearnings and desires. Thus, there appear to be two principles of motion for animate 
beings: δρεξ  t^and νους.
Were we to take this as the conclusion of the question of origins, it would be a 
misstep. As so often happens with such preliminary explorations, what we have been 
given are not conclusions, but άπορ ία  of appearances, to be further explored. In III-10, 
reasons are given for why the two appear to be the origins of motion (433al0-30), but 
this exposes calculation and imagination in subsidiary roles relative to appetite. It is the 
character of appetite to take an object -  a yearning is a yearning for something. The 
relevant calculative role is the practical one whose end-in-view is the object of appetite. 
Key is the recognition that βουλησις is a form of όρεξ ις  (433a25), thus subsuming 
practical reason as a function of appetite rather than as distinct from it. Νους is always 
right (433a26), but π ρα κ τό ν  can be otherwise (433a31). This leads us on to the 
appearance that the capacity in the soul that produces movement must be ο ρ ε ξ ις  
(433a32).
Aristotle now seems to have resolved the issue, explaining opposing ό ρεξε  ι ς as 
arising between βουλησις and ε π ιθ υ μ ία ,,  both being appetite, when the former resists 
with a view to the future, while the latter only considers appetite in the present (433b5- 
10). But, just when he can conclude that it is the όρεκτ ι κόν  that originates motion in 
the soul, he must acknowledge that the ό ρ ε κ τό ν , which is the object of the yearning, 
must be first in originating movement. It moves the animal to yearning by being the 
object of thought or imagination, thus contributing to the origin of motion without itself 
being moved. The originators of motion prove to be plural after all. (433M0-12). Here 
Aristotle exposes a kind of dual dispositionality that he has already developed in his 
treatment of α ίσθησις. Both perception and appetite take an object. Just as the object of 3
3 Compare, for instance, the beginnings of Metaphysics VII-3, where form, matter and the composite are 
preliminary candidates for substance, and by the end of the chapter, matter has been explicitly eliminated 
from the list (1029a28)
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perception is the αίσθη τόν  that activates the αίσθη τ ι κόν, so the object of yearning is 
the όρεκ τό ν  that activates the όρεκτ ι κόν. Because it is the nature of both faculties of 
the soul to require an object, they each also require a dual dispositionality, that within the 
soul to become the activity and that without to undergo the activity. In both cases the 
disposition of the umnoved object to be acted up is a precondition of the activity.4
In perception, the αίσθη τ ικόν  and the α ισθητόν  become one in the 
α ϊσ θ η σ ις . Where the dispositionalities of appetite differ from those of perception is in 
the two-stage character of their fulfillment. In the first stage, the actualization of the 
δρεξ L ç itself arises from the linking of the two dispositions through the intermediaries 
of perception, imagination and thought. This is what makes νοϋς  (now in the broadened 
sense to include imagination) a necessary component of the actualization of όρέξις. But 
this is still only the first stage of the moves to movement: It is the coming-to-be of the 
specific purpose-focused yearning. In an actualization that results in a βούλησις, 
deliberation produces a choice, which is a grasping for a particular όρεκτόν before 
another, thus specifying the specific ορεκτικόν that becomes activated. What makes for 
the possible adversity among ορεκτικό, is the presence of multiple όρεκτά on any given 
occasion. Determination of which objective to act upon is a determination of which 
potential yearning is to become actual as the determinate yearning to be acted upon. Once 
that is determined, the actualized δρεξ  ¿£ produces the movement to its fulfillment, the 
second stage. It may be that deliberation takes place calculating the means to that 
fulfillment and even which objective is best under the circumstances, but this too is a part 
of the coming-to-be of the δρεξ ις  for this movement. The actual appetite, the δρεξ ις  is 
the result of the deliberative process, not its antecedent. The β ο ύ λ ε υ σ ις  of deliberation 
produces the β ο ύ λ η σ ις  of choice, and this π ρ ο α ίρ ε σ ις  is the δ ρ ε ξ ις  . Once 
formulated, the δρεξ  ις  leads immediately to action. That which is moved moves in so 
far as it reaches after something, and the κ t ν ε σ ις  is the δρεξ  ις  in so far as it is the 
one that is έ ν έ ρ γ ε ia { 433b 18).
Where Aristotle began in III-10 with expanding the notion of νους to include 
imagination, he now in III-l 1 projects imagination across other faculties of sensation and 
calculation.5 δρεξ  ις , as actualization of the όρεκτ ι κόν  relative to όρεκτόν, is the 
source of motion, but it cannot become so without imagination to put the two dispositions 
into relation. For all animals that initiate movement, there must be at least some sort of 
sensory imagination, but only those with reasoning capacity have calculative imagination. 
It is this ability to trace implications for the future that enables the calculative to imagine 
alternative objectives of appetition. Because calculative imagination can consider 
multiple imagined objectives at the same time, it indeed has the potential for contrary 
effects, as noted in Metaphysics IX-5, which is why choice is necessary to determine the 
proper δ ρ ε ξ ις  for this place and time and circumstance.
While.the calculative appetite may always pursue the apparently greater practical 
good, the disposition to the calculative appetite does not always give cause for the actual 
appetite. “Sometimes in the conflict among the imagined possible δρεξβ ις , that
4 Here, I follow as a model Aiyeh Kosman’s treatment of perception in “Perceiving That We Perceive,” 
Philosophical Review 84 (1975): 499-519.
5 Hendrick Lorenz, The Brute Within (O x fo r d , 2006) , o f f e r s  a d e t a i l e d  a c c o u n t o f  
t h i s  e x p a n d in g  r o l e  o f  φ α ν τ α σ ία  in the determination of appetite.
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imagined appetite moves this one, as one celestial sphere moves another, appetite moving 
appetite, so that ά κ ρ α σ ία  comes into being.” (434al3) Here Aristotle seeks in an 
analogy to the movement of the celestial spheres an account of how one envisioned 
objective, moving another, by virtue of that movement, may have its own course. This 
returns us to the problem of ά κρα σ ία , but it also leads us on to reflections about 
differences between the movements of the spheres and the coming to be of an όρεξ ις. 
“Always in nature, the more dominant also moves, in as much as already three motions 
are being moved. The capacity for knowing is not moved, but stands still.” (434al5) 
What moves in the determination of an όρεξ ις  are beliefs about such general knowledge 
as applied to that determination. “Since on the one hand, there is the assumption and 
account according to the whole, but on the other, that according to each situation (for one 
assumption tells that there is need in such a situation to achieve such as this, and another 
tells that such a situation is now, and that I am the one to achieve it), it appears that it is 
this opinion that moves, not that according to the whole.” (434a20) The point here is that 
our knowledge of the general does not change, only our application to a particular 
situation in which a particular need is discerned.
This is not a prototype for a practical syllogism, with the first premise stating a 
general truth and a second an application of that truth. For such an analysis to work, one 
would need to build into the first premise some presumptions about a generalization 
placing some value on a need fulfillment, with the second asserting that this situation is a 
circumstance under which such fulfillment can be enacted. A more accurate reading, I 
think, is that Aristotle is here still sorting out the roles of νους  and όρεξ ις  in the origins 
of movement. The role of knowledge is to stand still, and the dual applications of 
knowledge as beliefs relevant to each situation, both that there is a need in this situation 
to pursue some longing and that I am in a circumstance for pursuing such an objective 
successfully. Both the appraisal of the appetitive disposition (the ό ρεκ τ lkóv) and the 
appraisal of its objective in this situation (the όρεκτόν) are conditions on coming to the 
determination of what I actually want here and now (the όρεξ ι g), but in deliberation for 
action, those dispositions to appetite must be informed by knowledge. What is variable 
and subject to change is not the knowledge itself, but the ways in which one applies it in 
an individual situation.
At least two points in our analysis here tell against traditional inteipretations. First 
is recognition that the determination of the relevant όρεξ ις  as a product of deliberation, 
not its antecedent. It is the activation of the όρεκτ ι κόν  relative to the ό ρεκ τό ν  that 
produces the ό ρ ε ξ ις .  For an έπ ιθ υ μ ία , all that is needed is for the perceptual 
imagination to present the organism with an object that correlates to its need. For a 
β ο ύ λ η σ ις , a calculation is required that determines which imagined objective best 
fulfills the needs of the organism. This calculation opens the way for one need to move 
another, so the β ο ύ λ η σ ις  as determined often will be a product of one potential όρεξ t ς 
competing with another. It may itself be swayed by the very competing forces it attempts 
to resolve. How this comes about Aristotle does not spell out here, He only notes that 
such deliberation does not alter our knowledge; only the beliefs regarding this situation 
are altered. Second, it is the potential reaching out toward its potential objective that 
produces the όρεξ ις. Deliberation aids in determining the right appetitive disposition 
relative to the right dispositional objective in this situation.
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Some have sought an account of that deliberative process on the model of the so- 
called practical syllogism that has suggested itself in On the Motion o f Animals 7. Here, 
Aristotle but draws an analogy between arriving at a conclusion in scientific inquiry and 
coming to a motion. His aim here is to show why noetic activity (imagination or thought) 
sometimes results in motion, sometimes not. For scientific inferencing, the reckoning up 
(σ υ λ λ ο γ ι ζομένος) from the two propositions put forward (εκ των δυο  
προτάσεω ν) yields a truth, but in matters of motion, the antecedents stretch forward to 
an action. What determines the results are not the verities of nature, but the bringing 
together the good and the possible. He accents that the good in question is not some soil 
of ultimate good, but a good in view, an object of appetite (ό ρ εκ τό ν ) and an object of 
intention (δ  ι ανοη τόν ) having to do with the aim of action (700b23-25).
Here we have very much a recapitulation of the account we already found in On 
the Soul III-ll. If one were to conceive that all men must walk [under such and such 
circumstances] and that he is a man, then he must walk. If one were to conceive the 
opposite, then he must remain at rest. The must (the subjunctive -τεό ν )  here has the 
force not of moral obligation, but of a practical necessity, based on the already 
determined end in view relevant to a need at hand that brings together the good and the 
possible. In the case considered, the must is generated by an already actualized appetite. 
The minor premise falls out enthymematically, Once it has been determined what is good 
for man in general, one need not reflect about his own humanity (701a25-29). The result 
is a direct move from a single protasis to an action6. “Face to face with the inquiring 
noetics [perception, imagination, thought], the actuality of the appetite comes to be. I 
want to drink, says ε π ιθ υ μ ία ; this is drink, says perception, imagination or thought. 
Immediately, I drink. In this way, animals start to move and act. The uttermost cause of 
motion is appetite, arising after perception, or after imagination or thought.” (701a30-37) 
Because appetite is the bridge from circumstantial observations to action by putting 
together the want (ο ρ ε κ τ ικ ό ν ) with its object (ό ρ ε κ τό ν ) , Aristotle castes it as a 
cause and middle term in the definition of movement because it makes this bridge 
(703a5). The explorations in analogy to syllogistic here have not to do, however, with the 
arrival at decision to act through the course of deliberation since they clearly concern the 
direct move from the already actualized appetite to action.
Aristotle’s account of deliberation and choice in Ethica Nicomachea also follows 
on the dispositional account of coming to be of an op εξ  ι ς in On the Soul. “When the 
deliberative choice is the objective of appetite for us, the choice of this would also be the 
devisable appetite for us, for from that which was deliberated, that is stretched toward the 
object according to the deliberation.” (1113al0) The coming to be of the β ο ύ λ η σ ις  is 
the product of the β ο ύ λ ε υ σ ις , and as an actualized ορεξ ις  it already stretches out 
toward its determined object to be achieved. “We might say, on the one hand, that the 
objective according to true judgment is good in an unqualified sense, but, on the other, in 
a particular circumstance the objective will be whatever appears to be good; that which is 
true judgment for the diligent, chance for the frivolous.” (1143a23-26). So just because
6 The instance considered with multiple conditions (701al8-24) may well be treated on analogy to a sorites. 
The need is for warmth; the covering is the object to satisfy that need, which leads to the coat as the object 
to satisfy that need. The need for a coat leads then to the objective of making that coat. So the action 
immediately undertaken is for the objective of bring into being the objective to satisfy the immediate need.
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the aim is for achieving what is best, one can make bad judgments about what is best in 
this place and time. No one seeks only the apparent good, but whatever appears to be 
good to the person will often appear to be good without qualification in this 
circumstance. The one who deliberates with diligence will seek true judgment, but the 
frivolous will take whatever chances to be his resolve. The judgment is not about what is 
unqualifiedly good, but about what under the circumstances is most needed, and thus 
what will be the best appetite to initiate what action to what goal.
The one place in the entire extant Aristotelian corpus that comes close to speaking 
directly of a practical syllogism is in the context of fathoming practical wisdom in EN 
VI-12: “For the conclusions drawn about practical things are those having a beginning, 
since the end and the best is such, whatever it may be (for the sake of discussion, let it be 
whatever it happens to be).” oí γάρ συλλογισμοί των πρακτών αρχήν εχοντές είσιν, 
επειδή τοιόνδε τό τέλος καί τό άριστον, οτιδήποτε ον (έστω γάρ λόγου χάριν τό 
τυχόν) (1144a31-34). The point being made is that this starting point will be evident to 
the good man, but wickedness may pervert us into being deceived about the starting 
point. The reference is not to a “practical syllogism”, per se, but to conclusions drawn 
about practical things. The focus is on the end in view, discerned correctly as the best by 
the good man, but distorted by those wanting in goodness. This discernment of the best 
end in view is a matter of practical experience, not of deductive inference, and 
experienced people have an eye for it. This again is the starting point for motion, the 
όρ εκ  τόν  that answers to the needs of the όρεκ τ ι κ ό ν .
The point that Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes in his accounts of deliberation is 
that the relevant general is derivative from the individual circumstances relative to felt 
needs. This is not a deductively reasoned starting point for determining action. Nor is it 
some induction from an instance to a universal generalization, but rather a linking of a 
specific appetitive disposition to a general objective that warrants the actualized όρεξ ι g. 
If, to use his example (1147a25-b5), you observe in a situation a sweet, and you have the 
general belief that all sweets are desirable to eat, considered without any qualification by 
other considerations, you will, if able and not restrained, eat the sweet. But if, in the same 
situation, you also have, for whatever circumstantial reasons (it will spoil your supper, 
ruin your diet, rot your teeth, etc.), the conviction that sweets under these circumstances 
are to be avoided, you may then have those contrary appetitive dispositions about which 
Aristotle spoke in the Metaphysics and in the Psychology. Both computations are correct, 
and each by itself would lead to action relative to the situation (one to eating, the other to 
refraining), but they cannot both be enacted, so it cannot be that both appetitive 
dispositions will become actual appetites for this person in this place and time. The 
diligent and disciplined deliberator will on this occasion avoid the sweet (on some other 
occasion, she might happily indulge that appetite). The frivolous will ignore or rationalize 
the constraining considerations in order to pursue the desiderative appetite here and now. 
The logic of the matter is not failure of knowing what is right, απλός , since each general 
is correct in abstraction, but, as a calculation to choice, under these circumstances, it is 
the one that serves the well-being of the actor in the long run, not just the desire in the 
immediate, and that produces the appropriate appetite to act upon.
So the deliberative process is not so much a proper inference from principle and 
circumstance to a proposed action (which still leaves puzzling how the conclusion itself 
is an action) as it is picking the right objective to enact on this occasion. That enacting is
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the actualization of an op εξ  t ς in a choice that directly leads to the movement necessary 
to achieve its objective. The role of νοϋς in grasping the right ό ρεκ τό ν  is the 
determination of which of the competing όρεκτ ι κόν  is best fulfilled in this situation for 
the well-being of the organism; but this, as Aristotle notes, is not a theoretical enterprise, 
but one that depends upon disciplined habituation of dispositions. For the άκρα τής, the 
problem is not so much a lack of knowledge, but a lack of discipline in applying what she 
knows. This is a matter of dispositionalities, not of rational inferences.
We can imagine competing spheres of appetite for the akrasic. Perceptive 
imagination says “There’s a sweet.” Epithumia\ (desiderative appetite) would say 
“Sweets are pleasant,” and she would straight away eat it. But bouleusis\ (toward a 
calculative appetite) would say, “Sweets will spoil your diet, and you will gain more 
weight. What you really need now is exercise, which will blunt your desire for the sweet 
and contribute to reducing weight.” But, bouleusis2 (toward boulesis2) would say, “A cup 
of coffee is also pleasant, will slake my desire for the sweet, and drinking it will be a lot 
easier than doing exercises right now.” Then perceptive phantasia (leading to epithumiai) 
would say, “I used to enjoy a smoke with a cup of coffee - before I quit - and they really 
are pleasant together (and bouleusis3 would add that a smoke would also help slake my 
desire for the sweet).” So, whaf s an akrasic to do here and now, but light up! It’s not that 
she doesn’t know the implications of her action. In all of this whirl of orectic spheres, 
what nous knows remains unmoved. There is nothing defective in the logic of the 
reflections, but even the deliberations that would lead to boulesis2 (which the person of 
practical wisdom might well observe is only a second best) open the way for a new 
sphere of desiderative appetite that leads to breaking a good habit in an effort to avoid an 
immediate urge. The conflicting dispositions are deliberatively resolved into an appetite 
that once chosen leads directly to action, but only an apparent good, not the best for her 
well being. Clearly she knows all of the knowledge involved in these deliberations, but 
does not apply it in a practical way that will foster her best interests in the long run. In the 
whirl of the spheres of orexis, she has lost sight of that good, like a person drunk or 
asleep7.
This account of άκρασ i a  not only shows how one can know the good and not do 
the good. It exemplifies how deliberation is a matter of matching up an objective for 
action with the current needs of the organism. This is not a process of deductive inference 
from a general moral truth applied to a particular circumstance, but a matter of joining 
dual dispositions in the actualized appetite that then leads directly to action.
7 One might find a similar example in Oklahoma’s Ado Annie: “I’m just a girl who can’t say no,” [even 
though] “I’ve known what’s right from wrong since I was ten,” [but]“when I’m with a feller, I forget.” She 
even cites the Golden Rule as a rationale for obligation to kiss him back.
